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Part 1 
(April 26, 2011) 
 
I’ve been slowly working my way through Helmut Gollwitzer’s The Christian Faith and the 
Marxist Criticism of Religion (Scribner, 1970), over the past while. I did one post on it 
previously. I’ve enjoyed the read as a whole, but the last chapter stopped me in my tracks. For in 
this chapter, entitled “Christian Encounter with Atheism,” Gollwitzer teases out the lessons that 
theology ought to learn from an engagement with the Marxist criticism of religion. So, I’ve 
decided to put together an eight-part miniseries on this chapter, highlighting the six points 
Gollwitzer makes, along with a treatment of his introductory remarks and his conclusion – which 
provide a context for the six points.  
 
Kait Dugan recently teased me, saying - in a clearly derogatory manner - that my blog is "largely 
occupied with announcements and book excerpts." Perhaps this mini-series will go some way in 
answering her imprecations.  
 
 
 
Gollwitzer argues that Marxism’s atheism and its Messianism (utopianism) are mutually 
implicating. Messianism provides a way of overcoming the crisis opened by atheism, and 
atheism is confirmed by that overcoming insofar as it demonstrates that no God is necessary for 
humanity’s salvation. So Gollwitzer: 
 
[T]he one confirms the other: because God does not exist, a world must be constructed, 
first in thought, and then in reality, in which man does not need God, and so no longer 
regrets God’s non-existence…On the other hand: because this man has now decided to 
see his dignity in not requiring God, and can come to fulfillment without God, therefore 
he must also show that God does not exist (146). 
 
What should be the Christian response to this constellation of issues? In what way should 
Christianity go about engaging with Marxism or, we might say more simply in a more 
contemporary North American context, atheistic secularism [Ed. note: Gollwitzer’s text is 
interesting as it stands, but don’t get hung up on his reference to Marxism of Communism – his 
discussion applies far more broadly]? Gollwitzer notes that the mere existence of a truly 
Christian community raises a question within such a society as a phenomena for which there is 
no explanation, undermining that society’s theoretical certainty about itself. 
 
However, there is much more to say about this encounter, for it is an encounter that equally 
raises question to the Christian community about the truth of its existence. I leave you with the 
following length (to say the least!) quote. As always, bold is me (underlining as well, for even 
more emphasis): 
 
[Christianity] must win from its faith the inner freedom to judge its own history 
relentlessly under the accusations of Communism, without thereby losing its glad 
confidence in its message, without prejudice and without anger admitting the 
Communists to the brotherhood in the solidarity of the godless, without thereby losing its 
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freedom and courage to make clear and emphatic contradiction.  
 
Above all, this community will have to abstain from the indignation which is widely 
felt today in Church circles, as if atheism were a new-fangled and vicious invention 
of the Communists. The original thing in it is merely that here atheism is taken 
seriously, whereas the Church and its position in society have long depended on the 
fact that the world around it is indeed atheist, but would not wish to do without its 
Christian decoration… But now, on the contrary, the consequences are drawn from the 
already long-present atheism of natural scientists, historians, psychologists and 
sociologist, from the materialism of the capitalist economy, from Christianity’s lack of 
influence on manufacture, commerce, and politics, from the schizophrenic division of 
man into a weekday heathen and a Sunday Christian, from the failure to implement 
Christian social doctrines (the gulf between white and coloured peoples, not 
bridged, but rather deepened by Christianity, the merely verbal reservations about 
the whole capitalist development)… This shatters the former feeling of security of the 
church, which had ever and again comforted itself with the secure anchorage of 
Christian morals among the people, and with the respect for Chritianity at least as a 
cultural and sentimental factor among those who were not practising [sic] 
Christians, and which therefore made confident claim to respect and privilege. 
Communism is without respect for what merely exists; it suspects that it might already 
belong to the past, and allows it to continue in existence only when it can prove its right 
to do so. This disrespectful and drastic questioning arouses alarm and indignation in the 
Church. This is a reaction of the ecclesiastical ‘flesh’… The spiritual reaction against it 
must consist in this, that the Church should not only admit, but inwardly accept the 
fact that this is how things stand, that Christianity is no longer taboo, but that every 
conventional status and reputation has been taken from it… The Church must take in 
the fact that the world no longer takes it from granted. But by the fact of ceasing to 
do so, the world is taking the Church with new seriousness – or at least there is 
given the possibility that it will take it with new seriousness. The Church can only 
inwardly accept this situation, if it understands the burden of being called in question by 
the world around it as God’s question addressed to it, as the question addressed to it in 
judgment and grace by its own Lord, who wishes thereby to revive it (148-50). 
 
 
 
Part 2 
(April 27, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The first of these 
tasks is to discern whether and to what extent the Marxist criticism of Christianity is on to 
something. So Gollwitzer: 
 
[T]his criticism of religion makes us aware of a transition which is repeatedly to be 
observed in the various epochs of Church history – a transition from a critical challenging 
of the existing order by the Christian message to an ideological support of the existing 
order (151). 
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In other words, the Marxist criticism of Christianity, falling as it does under a broader criticism 
of religion in general, serves to reveal the way in which the church has lost its prophetic voice. 
Rather than confronting the powers and injustices of this world, the church all too often becomes 
the opiate of the masses. A true, living church can never be this, but a dead church always is. 
Along these same lines, the Marxist criticism of religion also 
 
draws our attention to the singular limitation of most Christian movements of 
renewal…they limit the thrust of their attack and challenge to the sphere of the private 
person, remain socially conservative, attacking the heathenism of individuals, but not 
of institutions…the legitimate application of the gospel to the individual…runs in fact 
precisely and inevitably the risk of encouraging the illegitimate modes of piety, a selfish 
religious desire for salvation, a flight from the world, and a fatalistic submission and the 
like (ibid; bold is mine). 
 
These days, this is perhaps especially truth in the North American context, whose Christianity 
has been decisively shaped by ‘great awakenings’ and revivals, and whose most pervasive 
religious impulse seems to be the desire for individual salvation - which translates quite easily, I 
might add, into a desperate craving for the assurance of political or social safety. Of course, all 
these limitations and dangerous impulses fed into the Marxist criticism of religion: 
 
The Marxist accusations are a catalogue of actual Christian degenerations. One 
should attempt to read the theological and edifying literature of the nineteenth century 
with the eyes of a man like Karl Marx, before whose keen vision the trend of the times 
and the problems of the present and the future were evident in all their grimness, while 
there he could find almost nothing but blind ignorance! This ignorance he saw to be 
based on a piety which he all too hastily took for the real thing (151-2; bold is mine). 
 
The corollary of this is the following: if the church wishes to avoid criticisms from Marxist or 
other atheistic quarters, it must purge itself of these dangerous mutations and demonstrate that 
the piety in question here is not, in fact, the real thing. 
 
 
 
Part 3 
(April 28, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The second of these 
tasks is to reassess the practice of apologetics. Gollwitzer makes a distinction between two types 
of apologetics. On the one hand is what we might call “better” apologetics. This form of 
apologetics is necessary for theology, and it is concerned with 
 
going beyond the positive exposition of the meaning of the statements of Christian faith, 
to a polemical rejection of the appeal of Marxism to so-called contradictions between 
Christian faith and modern science, to challenge the validity of the opponent’s arguments, 
and so on (152). 
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It is clear that Gollwitzer has in mind here something like defensive apologetics, aimed at 
showing the plausibility, or the non-contradiction of Christian faith with life in the modern 
world. In other words, the task of this apologetics is to establish and maintain the distinction 
between methodological atheism in the natural sciences, for instance, and dogmatic atheism as a 
worldview. Worth noting is Gollwitzer’s proviso that any sort of “God of the gaps” apologetics 
is a non-starter and ought to be rejected.  
 
Another form of apologetics is what we might call “bad” apologetics. As opposed to “better” or 
“defensive” apologetics, we might call this one “worse” or “offensive” apologetics. In this form, 
apologetics attempts – to put things crassly – to argue people into the Christian faith. Such is 
simply not possible, for reasons that will be explained more thoroughly in Gollwitzer’s next 
point (to be treated in the next installment of this series, Part 4). Suffice it for now to raise a 
warning: 
 
apologetics cannot afford to attempt to adduce supports for Christian faith, which can 
then be pulled around, and whose questionable character discredits Christian faith (ibid). 
 
 
 
Part 4 
(April 29, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The third of these 
tasks is an elaboration on the second, which was a discussion of apologetics. Gollwitzer returns 
now to what he considers to be a very dubious – perhaps the most dubious – form of apologetics, 
namely, that build on a “God of the gaps” or on a dues ex machine. The problem with this 
approach isn’t, strictly speaking, that the modern age witnessed the end of the regnant 
metaphysics that made such argument possible, although Gollwitzer recognizes that this is the 
case. Instead, this approach is problematic because 
 
To argue against our opponents with this sort of necessity of God was from the beginning 
a self-misunderstanding of Christian faith (153). 
 
Here is how Gollwitzer parses the nitty-gritty: 
 
Marxism…sums up the results of this end of the great tradition of scholastic thinking in 
the analogia entis in so far as the latter had claimed to find by speculation the rational 
ground of earthly being in the divine summum ens (most real being), and therefore 
conversely to pass by inference from the conditioned to the unconditioned. The 
presuppositions of faith concealed in these apparently rational operations have long been 
evident, and give Marxism the opportunity of unmasking this kind of philosophy as 
disguised theology (ibid). 
 
Gollwitzer is actually being nice to theologians in the scholastic tradition. He recognizes that 
those theologians worked out of faith’s conviction, which served as a ground for their thought-
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experiments with reference to God. The problem is that they were not clear about this 
foundation, nor were they careful to distinguish how this foundation fundamentally sets them 
apart from broader metaphysical inquiry in the traditions of Plato and Aristotle. The result of 
these failures is this: when the metaphysics to which theology had been joined was seen to fail, it 
was not at all self-evident that theology should not ultimately and necessarily fail as well.  
 
The flip side of this is Gollwitzer’s recognition – in the concluding sentence of the above quote –
that ultimately the sort of metaphysical inquiry established in the tradition is a form of 
philosophy rather than theology. For Gollwitzer, this applies to all forms of idealism. 
Consequently, 
 
Christian theology must see in the Marxist identification of Christianity and idealism a 
warning for itself not to bind the Christian faith for better or for worse to idealistic 
metaphysics. It does this, for example, so long as it includes the faith in creation under 
the inquiry about an explanation of the world. For then if the article of our faith about the 
creation is understood as an assertion of reason, God is a function of our self-
understanding and our understanding of the world… (154). 
 
Here is the payoff: 
 
In view of the idealistic influence on Christian thinking since the time of early 
Catholicism, the end of Christian metaphysics demands a thorough-going theological 
self-criticism, to which Marxism (with its interpretation of Christianity as a special case 
of idealism and idealism as a special case of theology), has given a fruitful impulse (ibid; 
bold is mine). 
 
Christians owe thanks to Marxism, in other words, for so driving us back to a consideration of 
our particularity by unceremoniously lumping us in as a species within a broader genus of 
thought. 
 
 
 
Part 5 
(May 02, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The fourth of these 
tasks continues Gollwitzer’s sally against apologetics. The particular form of apologetics that 
attracts Gollwitzer’s ire now, however, is that which would link Christianity with religion as a 
general category and, attempting to demonstrate that religion is a necessary facet of human 
culture and development, thus hope to secure Christianity’s pedigree. As true as such claims may 
be about religion, and Gollwitzer is willing to entertain that possibility, he provides four 
reflections on the issue.  
 
 
1. Such arguments cannot defeat the immanentism of the Marxist criticism. To begin, who 
cares about this immanentism when leveled at religion? Christianity has no dog in that 
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fight. Furthermore, a general defense of religion will not defeat this immanentism. So 
Gollwitzer: Christianity “cannot prove, or wish to prove, that the living God to whom the 
biblical word bears witness does not belong to the immanent conditions of the world, and 
is not a product of our need. It can, however, indicate that this is not so, by showing how 
in his revelation he distinguishes himself from the gods” (155). In other words, 
Christianity should show that its God is not one of the gods, leaving the latter to fend for 
themselves since “It is with the powers of this world, positive and negative, that we have 
to do in religion, not with the Creator himself, who must in his freedom encounter us, in 
order that we may have such dealings with him as to know him and be able to speak with 
him” (ibid). 
 
2. Secularism pushes these things further, although Marxism is only one form of secularism. 
Whereas in the past Christianity could assume the general religiosity of those it 
encountered, such is no longer the case. It would be a mistake for Christianity to think 
that it first had to reproduce this general religiosity among its hearers before proclaiming 
the uniquely Christian message. No, that message must be proclaimed in such a way as to 
bypass the need for this general religiosity. Of the secular person, Gollwitzer writes: 
 
Without his putting himself in a religious frame of mind, creating for himself 
religious experiences, awakening within himself a so-called natural consciousness 
of God, thus without his being compelled to adopt forms of consciousness which 
he can no longer recapture, he must be encountered in his life, which has become 
secular, by the good news from the Lord of the world, who has committed himself 
in the man Jesus of Nazareth to the world and the secularity of the stable and the 
gallows” (155-6). 
 
This, Gollwitzer maintains, is what Bonhoeffer was on about when he spoke of a “non-
religious interpretation” of the gospel. 
 
3. What theology should focus on in the encounter with Marxism, then, is not the antithesis 
between atheism and religion, but the one “between the ‘God for us’ of the gospel, and 
the human refusal to live in the strength of the vital reality of this ‘God for us’” (156). In 
other words, it must call the world to repentance, to abandon the attempt at self-
justification, which can take religious, secular, technological, and other forms. Nothing is 
ultimately gained if a culture or an individual converts from atheism to religion, so far as 
Christianity is concerned: “The only conversion with brings something new, is that form 
law to gospel” (ibid). The strength of this conversion is that it tears us away from all 
these forms of self-justification. It “ends our existence as functionaries of a front 
representing a world-view, and makes us messengers of the love which from above seeks 
every individual, the religious man as the atheist, as a creature beloved, which must leave 
the tense struggle against the feared non-being, to receive fellowship with him who 
places himself between the creature and non-being” (157). 
 
4. All this lies behind Gollwitzer’s concluding statement, which provides a very measure 
paradigm for Christian engagement with Marxist criticism. I’ll quote it in entirety: 
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Thus it is possible without prejudice, without irritation, and defensiveness to 
discuss with the Marxists the phenomenon and the problems of religion. Not the 
Christian message but our human method of receiving and embodying it, the 
Christian religion, will there, so far as Christianity is in question, be dealt 
with, but it must not be withdrawn from criticism. In this, theology will be 
both the defender of religion over against the onesidedness, the superficiality and 
the fatuities of Marxist criticism, and at the same time the ally of this criticism 
against cruelties, stuffiness, terrorism and like inhumanities of the religious life 
(157; bold is mine). 
 
 
 
Part 6 
(May 03, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The fifth of these 
tasks concerns a renewed consideration of what it means for theology to be a science. Gollwitzer 
recognizes that the tradition has long considered theology to be a science, and he affirms that 
status. Or, he at least defends its claim to be scientific even if it not strictly speaking an 
independent science: 
 
Theology indeed participates in the other sciences, has a nexus with them, uses them, 
welcomes them in its own sphere, inasmuch as here also, for example, philosophy and 
history in the strict sense are studied. It is certainly not really ‘a’ science, but (in this 
resembling medicine), a sphere in which different sciences are united by their service of a 
determinate purpose, the critical self-examination of the Church in relation to the 
correspondence between its actual achievement and its task (157-8). 
 
Gollwitzer goes on to list three points to bear in mind concerning the responsibility that theology 
must faced because of its scientific character. 
 
1. Theology must be sure not to mislead other sciences by taking up a posture that opposes 
free investigation, or that seeks to enforce a law other than that inherent within the 
subject matter itself. 
2. Theology must be sure to develop methods that fit with investigation of its subject matter, 
to do so critically, working to clarify its concepts. 
3. Theology must be true to its peculiarity, and thereby embody an uncomfortable question 
for the other sciences as to their limits. 
 
Christianity’s peculiarity, and thus theology’s, “consists in the fact that it is related to a history, 
the history of revelation, about which it must make statements which go beyond the appearances 
which are accessible to the historian” (158). By doing so, it raises a serious question to the 
Marxist criticism of religion, making clear that every field of study has a special methodological 
perspective suited to its object and that, consequently, each perspective is limited. In this 
theology resists the temptation of the humane sciences to borrow the concept of “science” found 
in the natural sciences, and encourages the humanities to recognize their limited and provisional 
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status.  
 
The danger on which theology shines a spotlight here is scientism, “the superstition which makes 
a world-view out of modern science, and uses it as a quarry for the building of world pictures 
allegedly demanded and authorized by science” (159). For Gollwitzer, this impulse is a product 
of humanity’s inherently religious impulse deprived, by the Marxist and other criticisms, of the 
religious outlets previously open to it. Here is a good chunk of Gollwitzer by way of a 
conclusion (bold is me, as usual): 
 
Every assumption, every hypothesis can in science grow into a prejudice. Rightly 
understood, theology opens the way unconditionally to every investigation of fact. Faith 
in the creator is actually an affirmation of things as they are, and is opposed to all well-
meaning misrepresentation or taboo. Where science is understood as in conflict with faith 
(in the biblical sense of the word), and as a substitute for religion, the place is necessarily 
assigned to it [that] religion previously occupied. It is then required to give what it cannot 
give. It is then neither free nor subject to criticism, it becomes itself a taboo. Science 
must prove its freedom also in this, that it recognizes itself as a specific and therefore 
limited mode of knowledge, to which other aspects of reality are closed…The scientific 
attitude is not incompatible with Christian faith, but with the superstitious faith in 
science, and with the subjection of science to the demands of a need to believe, which 
finds an ideological satisfaction in it” (159-60). 
 
 
 
Part 7 
(May 04, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. The sixth of these 
tasks pertains to the question of meaning. Explanations of the world – worldviews, or 
metaphysics – attempt to provide security by means of bestowing meaning on brute phenomena. 
Ancient Christianity’s worldview/metaphysic was theological in two senses: first, because it 
made of use of God in explaining the world; second, because it viewed its explanation as 
identical with that which provides the world with meaning. Marxist makes use of science in a 
similar way, that is, as an explanation of the world that attempts to provide meaning. In the end, 
Gollwitzer says, “Marxism is a kind of positive Stoicism; more meaning [than that provided by 
science] is unfortunately not our lot, but at least we have this much” (160)!  
 
Positively, theology must recognize the difficulty with which one moves from science, or brute 
phenomena toward meaning. A sense of “need” is similarly not a trustworthy guide. To treat it as 
such would be to reintroduce something like natural theology, which has lurked behind much of 
Gollwitzer’s discussion. Ultimate meaning, Gollwitzer insists, cannot be read of the surface – or 
even from the depths – of human existence. Rather, meaning requires an encounter and 
fellowship with God. On the other hand, it is not the case that this God-bestowed meaning is 
entirely disconnected from human “need,” for Gollwitzer. It does, however, add a new depth and 
aspect to that need, situating it in a greater context and, indeed, showing us what our true need is. 
So Gollwitzer: 
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it is not the case that the fullness of meaning experienced in the gospel is the answer to an 
already manifest question. What the gospel offers is the answering of a question and 
the fulfillment of a need which is only awakened by the gospel. Therefore it can be 
satisfied only by the gospel. We are thus confronted here by a circle which we are 
always coming up against when we concern ourselves with theology; the gospel is the 
answer to a life-question; relevant, fully satisfying answer, but the question only arises 
through the proclamation of the answer (162; bold is mine). 
 
Or again, from a different angle: 
 
the death-bringing lack of fellowship with God, and the devastation wrought by evil is 
visible before the encounter with God’s condescension in the gospel, in all the 
phenomena of estrangement, lack of fellowship, perversion of life, which cause the ever-
repeated attempts to heal life, the religious as well as the atheistic ones. But how deep the 
injury is, and how inadequate, indeed, how destined to lead to further evil are the 
remedies offered for healing, this is only evident when God himself comes on the scene 
and his appearing at once judges our previous state as our own self-inflicted misery and 
removes it. Only in concrete encounter with the Word of God that speaks to us does 
man’s destiny become clear, and only in the light of this highest destiny of life in 
fellowship with God is the previous condition unmasked as the misery of the man who 
has forfeited his high destiny, and the also previously visible signs of defect and 
wickedness of life are exposed as consequences of forfeiting his destiny” (163). 
 
What does this mean for Christianity and theology? It means that they must stick to their guns, so 
to speak; they are “thrown entirely upon…faith in the self-evidencing power of its message” 
(165). The church ultimately has only one tool in its toolbox, namely, proclamation of the 
gospel. Granted, that proclamation will take different forms in different places and times. But 
this plurality of forms must be only that. In no sense can the church base its proclamation of the 
gospel on a condition that is not itself created by that proclamation. All such conditions have 
been contested, and contested well, by Marxism and other criticisms of religion. There is no 
sense casting about in search of a new one, for anything one finds with not be categorically 
different than those that have come before. Instead, the church must recognize its vulnerable 
position, and remember the saying of its Lord that his strength is made perfect in its 
weakness. The church - and theology, - need not "demonstrate to blind eyes, so that these 
will then be opened by a free decision; it can only proclaim to blind eyes the message 
committed to it, in the hope that this call itself, and he who is proclaimed in it as the real 
one will open men's eyes" (ibid; bold is mine). 
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Part 8 
(May 06, 2011) 
 
For Gollwitzer, the Marxist criticism of religion sets six tasks for theology. Having treated them, 
he concludes with two more points that Christians and theologians should bear in mind when 
engaging with the Marxist criticism of religion.  
 
1. Harkening back to the discussion in the last installment, Gollwitzer notes that for 
Christianity to base its message on humanity’s “need” would be to play into the Marxist 
criticism: “That God is the means to an end, even if an ineffective one, is a point in which 
Feuerbach and Marx are one” (167). Of course, this breaks down when faced with a more 
sophisticated way of understanding the Christian God, one based on value and not need: 
“Anyone who wishes adequately to understand biblical texts must…understand that there 
are encounters which primarily have their significance as such, and in relation to which 
the consideration of value is only secondary” (ibid). The encounter in view here is, of 
course, one with God. That such an encounter is valuable goes without saying. But what 
Christianity cannot and must not do is attempt to demonstrate the truth or superiority of 
Christianity on the basis of this value. It must not do so because to make the attempt 
would be to deny the nature of the case, and it cannot do so because this value is only 
accessible from within the encounter, not without. So Gollwitzer (bold is, as always, 
mine): 
 
It is not man and his needs that can be the meaning of God’s existence, but God is 
the meaning of the existence of man. Therefore what man receives in the 
encounter with God is not visible outside of or before this encounter, not outside 
of “faith”. For only in this encounter does God himself become important to 
men, not because of his meaning, or any value, but He himself - and just this is 
the most supremely satisfying answer to the question of meaning (168). 
 
2. The payoff of the whole of Gollwitzer’s discussion is this: “What the atheist denies is 
not what the Christian affirms” , or at least not what the Christian ought to affirm, or 
would affirm if there was more clarity on the issue. So, Christianity must, in the face of 
the Marxist criticism of religion, undertake “a self-critical examination of [its] own 
previous statements” (172), and it has made many of the unguarded variety over the 
centuries. But this does not deny the other side (bold is mine, as always), and I conclude 
with the following long block quotation: 
 
The whole polemic of Feuerbach indicates that the Christian faith is interpreted as 
the ‘assumption’ of the existence of a God, as the hypothesis that there is such an 
existence, and only distinguishes itself from polytheism by its concentration on 
one instead of many. The triumph over the fact that the sputnik and the 
subsequent space-travellers [sic] discovered no such being in the world of space is 
only an element of bathos in anti-religious propaganda and a booby-trap. The 
possibility of such primitive argumentation is, however, based on the fact 
that they denial of God occurs on the same ontological level as that on which 
people can discuss the existence of Martians; here one can set up theories pro 
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and con; here one can some day by testing discover what is right…The denial 
which finds expression in the assertion that ‘there is no God’ believes it is 
speaking about the Christian God, but speaks about something quite 
different…I make judgments about existent facts without thereby altering myself. 
But the denial of God cannot at all be spoken in this way as a meaningful 
sentence: the sentence “God is not” is either thoughtless chatter, or it is a self-
cancellation in revolt; “God must not be”. 
 
 
 
 
